Trita Parsi 2007 Youtube

April 9, 2009

Trita Parsi discusses his book on Iran, Israel, and the United States at UC Berkley.

Trita is described as a realist and analyses the relationship between Israel, Iran, and the US through the simplifying lens of power politics. He believes that rhetoric and idealogical fervour is squarely in second place behind the machinations of state interest in the region. Gives the example of continuity of the Shah’s regional objectives and those of Khomenei’s.

Some random points from the first 30mins of the video:

1.  The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the first Gulf War saw a change in the regional balance

- Israel & Iran who were tacit friends beforehand became more prominent and rivals

- They felt their power was unchecked

- The goal for both is to lock in a long term ascendant balance of power status

- Israel’s periphery strategy inverts: befriend direct neighbours and threaten periphery (Iran)

2. The bi-polar world collapsed

- the US enters the region through the 1st Gulf War

- Israel worried that any Iran-US accommodation would jeopardize its own strategic position

3. 1971 the Brits leave everything east of the Suez, both the Shah and Khomenei do not want to see them (or the Americans) return – the Gulf War changes this

- Iran is part of Nixon’s twin pillar policy

4. Jockying for regional influence and relative regional strength was always a factor but very much in second behind the Cold War conflict. The issues came to ahead once the Soviet Union collapsed

5. There was a continuation of the Shah’s realist regional perspective in the region under Khomenei. He cites the example of collaboration between Israel & the Shah’s Iran continuing under Khomenei’s Iran when the regime dependend on Israel for American parts & supplies in its war vs. Iraq. This all changed with end of the Cold War.

6. Parsi refers to an Iranian FP contradiction in that in the short run Iran has needed Israel’s support but in the long run Iran must come to terms with its immediate, and permanent Arab neighbours (to the West). One mechanism that Iran used to overcome the mistrust with Arab states was the anti-Israel rhetoric. The Shah played the same card.

7. Domestic factors matter but not as much as regional structure according to Parsi. As the regime in Iran is not in a comfortable position, and the region is in constant flux, it must head off the reality of possible oblivion. There is also no one fanction which completely dominates the discourse (ie. Reformers, Pragmaticists, and Conservatives). This deadens the weight of idealogical imperatives over realist imperatives.

8. The impact of the end of the Cold War had an important impact on Israel as the country lost much of its strategic value to the US.

… more but did not watch the end of the video.


NY Times’ Op-Ed Cohen on a roll

April 9, 2009

After a controversial but insightful series on Iran earlier this year, Roger Cohen of the NY Times has again produced another illuminating piece which deconstructs and rebutts Israeli regional thinking vis-a-vis Iran.

Cohen …
1. first accuses Israeli leaders of crying wolf by constantly warning of an Iranian nuke since the 1990s
2. describes the Iranian regime as repressive but debunks the messianic apocalyptic cult caricature
a. Israel was doing business with Iran in the 80-88 Iraq-Iran war
b. The regime has followed a realist approach centered around it survival ever since
3. rebutts the Israeli premier’s claims that the Iraq-Iran war did not sear a terrible wound … And explains this as driving factor for the younger generation wanting change through reform not upheaval.
4. argues that Arab states will not be led into viewing Iran as the primary enemy in the region but will continue to see Israel as the enemy
5. sums the Israeli interest is in maintaining the regional status-quo and opposing a re-ordering where Iran is bought in from the cold
6. thinks that Obama is not heeding Netanyahu’s call and gives as evidence the US participation in upcoming nuclear talks
7. believes that Obama is genuine about rapprochement with the Muslim world
8. concludes that Iranian regime reform is only possible through the negotiating table and that Iran’s nuclear progress is still a couple of years off producing highly enriched uranium
9. argues against Israeli hegemony in the region

The best line in the article …

Every scrap of evidence suggests that, on the contrary, self-interest and survival drive the mullahs.

V. refreshing article. How long will he last in his job!?  Cohen also cites TitraParsi’s Treacherous Alliance which reviews Israeli-Iranian relations.

A good comment … ;-)

It is indeed the realignment of the regional order which roils Israel’s leadership. If Iran does return into its “rightful place in the community of nations”, some think Israel’s ability to act in the region will be curtailed. On the other hand, a reconciled Iran will be less of a threat to Israel within a more stable regional security system. So perhaps it is in Israel’s own security interests to see the diplomatic overtures succeed? Though, in reality, is Iran truly a threat to Israel at the moment, or even with crude nuclear devices… hardly.

A point that Cohen alludes to, but which could be elaborated further, is that external threats play an important role in domestic politics in both Israel with “Mr. Iran” now the premier, and with Iran’s Ahmadinejad. The wind will be taken out of the sails of bellicose politicians in both countries if a détente succeeds and we will all be better off.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.